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INTRODUCTION 
Horror stories of urban natural disasters were once the occasional 
subject of glossy National Geographic articles or newspaper “shock” 
pieces.1 The articles described doomsday scenarios replete with ravaged 
cityscapes, flooded subway tunnels, submerged iconic buildings and 
landmarks, and scores of casualties. They also estimated multi-billion 
dollar price tags for disaster response and long-term recovery efforts.2 
In the last decade, these articles, which seemed more science fiction 
than clarion calls for action, proved prescient. In 2005, Hurricane 
Katrina and catastrophic failure of floodwall systems reduced New Or-
leans to a lifeless, nearly uninhabitable city for weeks.3 Katrina proved 
to be the third most expensive natural disaster in modern world histo-
ry.4 Ensuing storms proved Katrina was no fluke: Hurricane Rita (late 
2005) and Hurricane Gustav (2008) nearly delivered a second knock-out 
                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Erik Holm, A New York Hurricane: So Long, Subways, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 1, 2010, 5:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2010/09/01/hurricane-earl-new-york-
hurricane-so-long-subways/ (cautioning two years before Sandy’s landfall that “even a minor 
hurricane that lands in the wrong spot at the wrong time would bring destruction far worse 
than the region has ever seen”); The Man Who Predicted Katrina, PBS (Nov. 22, 2005), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/earth/predicting-katrina.html (interview with Louisiana State 
University professor who described the catastrophic flooding of New Orleans that would 
come to pass when Katrina’s floodwaters toppled the city’s floodwalls, lamenting in 2004 that 
“it . . . look[s] like it’s going to [take] a catastrophe in order to mobilize [the infrastructure 
changes necessary to protect New Orleans]”); Joel K. Bourne, Jr., Louisiana Wetlands: Gone 
with the Water, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 2004, at 92, available at 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2004/10/louisiana-wetlands/bourne-text (Ten months 
before Katrina’s landfall, this article explained in detail why “[t]he Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency lists a hurricane strike on New Orleans as one of the most dire threats to 
the nation, up there with a large earthquake in California or a terrorist attack on New York 
City.”); Mark Fischetti, Drowning New Orleans, SCI. AM., Oct. 2001, at 76, available at 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/drowning-new-orleans-hurricane-prediction/ (pos-
sibly the best known account predicting Hurricane Katrina’s devastation almost four years 
before the storm); Erik Larson, Hurricanes on the Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1999, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/25/opinion/hurricanes-on-the-hudson.html (discussing a 
study the “Army Corps of Engineers released in 1995, in which the [C]orps concluded that 
even a modest hurricane, on just the right track, could drive an immense storm surge into 
lower Manhattan, submerge Kennedy Airport and drown a few subway trains”). 
 2. See, e.g., Bourne, Jr., supra note 1, at 92 (recounting a doomsday scenario in 
which a hurricane would strike New Orleans, leaving tens of thousands dead and sewage 
and industrial waste blanketing the city); Chris Carroll, Hurricane Warning: In Hot Water, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 2005, at 72, available at 
www.ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2005/08/hurricane-warning/carroll-text (predicting that 
the Atlantic seaboard will see decades of catastrophic hurricanes); Rick Gore, Wrath of the 
Gods: A History Forged by Disaster, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, July 2000, at 37; Michael Parfit, 
Living with Natural Hazards, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, July 1998, at 2. 
 3. See The Man Who Predicted Katrina, supra note 1 (describing the conditions of 
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina). 
 4. See Amy Liu, Rebirth on the Bayou: Lessons from New Orleans and the Gulf 
Coast, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/the-
avenue/94251/rebirth-the-bayou-lessons-new-orleans-and-the-gulf-coast; see also Counting 
the Cost, ECONOMIST (Mar. 21, 2011, 5:30 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/03/natural_disasters. 
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punch to New Orleans and the Gulf Coast.5 The Atlantic Coast’s person-
al experience with catastrophic natural disasters followed several years 
later. In 2011, Tropical Storm Irene swiped New York City causing bil-
lions in damage.6 Just a year later, Hurricane Sandy, a rare and power-
ful late season storm, decimated large swaths of the New Jersey and 
New York coastlines, including parts of the lower tip of Manhattan and 
New York City’s densely populated coastal neighborhoods.7  
The federal government along with many state and local govern-
ments, has gained intimate, painful, firsthand knowledge about how 
major disasters can envelop and cripple American metropolitan areas. 
Such disasters carve, in stark relief, the characteristics of urban areas 
that help them endure crisis or rebound quickly from disaster.8 They 
serve as a type of x-ray film illuminating a city’s “broken bones”—the 
systems critical to its thriving, but which are missing or mired in dys-
function. Governments at all levels now face the daunting challenges of 
rebuilding cities quickly and ensuring they are stronger than before the 
disaster event.9 
Unsurprisingly, this has proven to be a tough task. The road to re-
covery for disaster-stricken cities such as Des Moines, Joplin, New Orle-
ans, and New York has been slow and punctuated by adversity.10 This 
challenge of rebuilding and simultaneously cultivating more resilient 
cities has become the focus of engineers, architects, economists, plan-
                                                     
 5. See Helen Gibbons, Gulf Coast Impacts of Hurricane Gustav and Ike Docu-
mented by USGS Extreme-Storms Group, USGS (Oct. 2008), 
http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2008/10/.  
 6. Sam Dolnick, Recovery is Slower in New York Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 
2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/nyregion/wind-and-rain-from-hurricane-irene-lash-new-
york.html.  
 7. See Ginger Adams Otis, Hurricane Sandy, One Year Later: Tracing the Super-
storm’s Path from Inception to Destruction, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 26, 2013, 5:27 PM), 
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/hurricane-sandy/sandy-1-year-storm-winds-article-
1.1495677. 
 8. See e.g., Judith Rodin, A Stronger, More Resilient New York, Rockefeller Foun-
dation (Jun 11, 2013), http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/stronger-more-resilient-
new-york.  
 9. See Christine Becker, Disaster Recovery: A Local Government Responsibility, 
PM MAG. (Mar. 2009), 
http://webapps.icma.org/pm/9102/public/cover.cfm?title=Disaster%20Recovery%3A%20%20A
%20Local%20Government%20Responsibility&subtitle=&author=Christine%20Becker. 
 10. See, e.g., Kyle Munson, 5 Years Later:  Remembering the 2008 Flood, 
DESMOINESREGISTER.COM (June 8, 2013),   
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20130609/NEWS/306090021/5-years-later-
Remembering-2008-flood; Tara McKelvey, Two Years After a Tornado, Joplin Struggles to 
Rebuild, BBC NEWS (May 22, 2013, 10:13 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-
22578180; John T. Marshall, Weathering NEPA Review: Superstorms and Super Slow Ur-
ban Recovery, 41 ECOLOGY. L.Q. (forthcoming 2014) (describing the extraordinary delays in 
delivery of federally-funded, long-term recovery projects to the residents of New Orleans); 
Laura Trevelyan, Superstorm Sandy: US Marks One Year Anniversary, BBC NEWS (Oct. 29, 
2013, 8:50 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24721439. 
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ners, non-profits, lawyers, building construction specialists, foundations, 
and policy makers.11 
A common, fundamental question being asked is: How do we devel-
op communities that can withstand disaster but also adapt to the myri-
ad challenges posed by natural hazards, economic crises, and/or dra-
matic population shifts?12 This paper suggests that governments use a 
City Resilience Index as a policy tool to measure cities’ comparative re-
siliency. A City Resilience Index employs quantitative metrics that pro-
vide critical data to governments, allowing them to identify current 
problems, track progress, and create more refined incentives for cities to 
incorporate specific tools, programs, and policies into their current and 
future planning.13 It also provides critical, comparative data for the for-
mulation of more rapidly deployed, targeted responses to catastrophic 
disasters.14 Devising and implementing a long-term recovery plan is a 
daunting process that leaves most states and cities flying blind.15 With 
the aid of an index, key players in developing resilient cities—
governments, the private sector, non-profit and philanthropic organiza-
tions, and most importantly, city residents—have a compass to guide 
disaster preparation and response, or simply to advocate for policy 
changes and investments to ensure the long-term vibrancy of cities.16 
A broad range of potential components may comprise a City Resili-
ence Index—from health care, to schools, to social services, to transpor-
tation infrastructure.17 This article looks at just two index components: 
(1) housing and (2) historic resources. We select these two critical con-
                                                     
 11. The Rockefeller Foundation has recently launched an initiative to select 100 re-
silient cities and endow them with financial support to create a chief resilience officer (CRO) 
along with technical support and resources to develop and implement plans for urban resili-
ence over the next three years.  See generally The Rockefeller Foundation 100 Resilient Cit-
ies Centennial Challenge, ROCKEFELLER FOUND., 
http://100resilientcities.rockefellerfoundation.org/ (last visited April 24, 2014). New York City 
and Boston have also recently conducted in-depth studies on the vulnerabilities of their re-
spective cities and strategies to make them more resilient. See CARL SPECTOR & LEAH 
BAMBERGER, CLIMATE READY BOSTON (2013), available at 
www.cityofboston.gov/news/uploads/30044_50_29_58.pdf; MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & N.Y.C., 
PLANYC: A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK (2013), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report.shtml. 
 12. One monograph examining resiliency in general calls this “preserving adaptive 
capacity.”   ANDREW ZOLLI & ANN MARIE HEALY, RESILIENCE:  WHY THINGS BOUNCE BACK 
6–8 (2012). 
 13. See Christina Hernandez Sherwood, Ranking the ‘Resilience’ of Hundreds of 
U.S. Cities, SMARTPLANET (July 20, 2011), http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/pure-
genius/ranking-the-resilience-of-hundreds-of-us-cities/ (discussing city resilience indexes and 
factors that are considered in compiling indexes). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Adam Stone, Long-Term Recovery Planning: What You Need to Know, 
EMERGENCY MGMT. (May 15, 2013), http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/Developing-
Long-Term-Recovery-Plan.html. 
 16. See Resilience, RESILIENTCITY.ORG, 
http://www.resilientcity.org/index.cfm?id=11449 (last visited April 24, 2014) (discussing how 
city resilience will allow cities to prepare and cope with future disasters). 
 17. Sherwood, supra note 13. 
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cerns because they represent important facets of virtually every city. 
Mindful of how housing and historic resources have figured prominently 
in recent long-term recovery programs,18 this paper identifies factors 
that are critical to evaluating resilience in these areas, and suggests 
how these factors might be measured to create a City Resilience Index 
score. 
Part I of this paper describes what a City Resilience Index is and 
why it is an effective public policy tool. Part II of this paper explores the 
reasons why a City Resilience Index supplies governmental, non-
governmental, and private citizens with a valuable guide to prepare for 
and overcome natural disasters and other challenges that threaten a 
city’s vitality. Drawing on lessons from recent disasters in the United 
States and abroad, Part III describes two essential components of any 
City Resilience Index: (A) housing and (B) historic resources. It specifies 
several of the critical and practical constituent parts of each of these two 
index components and fashions a framework for measuring their resili-
ence. 
I. WHAT IS AN INDEX AND WHY SHOULD POLICYMAKERS AND 
SCHOLARS CONSIDER USING ONE? 
Put simply, an index is a policy tool that identifies components crit-
ical to a city’s long-term resilience and establishes a framework to 
measure these components.19 While there is a defined, robust scholar-
ship in engineering and the social sciences that examines and measures 
urban systems that are critical to community resilience (e.g. environ-
mental sustainability and transportation infrastructure), legal scholar-
ship is just beginning to emerge.20 
                                                     
 18. The Disaster Relief Appropriations Act and Sandy Recovery Improvement Act 
of 2013 call for establishment of a Unified Federal Review process to coordinate environmen-
tal reviews required by environmental and historic preservation laws, including the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). See Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 
127 Stat. 4, 45–46 (2013).  See also FEMA’s Project Worksheets: Addressing a Prominent 
Obstacle to Gulf Coast Rebuilding: Hearing Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Disaster Recov-
ery of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs U.S. S., 110th Cong. 17–19 
(2007) (statement of Perry “Jeff” Smith, Jr., Acting Director of the Louisiana Governor’s Of-
fice of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg37355/pdf/CHRG-110shrg37355.pdf  (singling 
out the federal environmental and historic reviews required when using Community Block 
Development Grant (CBDG) funds as a major impediment to timely response to Louisiana’s 
housing recovery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita). 
 19. HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS 
FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 11 (Princeton Univ. Press 2009). 
 20. See YALE CTR. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y ET AL., 2012 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
INDEX AND PILOT TREND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX 7–9 (2012), available at 
http://www.epi.yale.edu/files/2012_epi_report.pdf (creating a measurable environmental 
performance index to reduce environmental stresses to human health and promote ecosys-
tem vitality and sound natural resource management) [hereinafter 2012 ENVIRONMENTAL 
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There is a small cadre of law review and legal journal articles—
notably an article by Professor Patricia Salkin—that offer resilience 
“checklists” or “toolboxes” that city leaders may consult to ensure that 
they are thinking comprehensively about sustainability.21 But legal 
scholars have been slower to explore a framework that subjects these 
legal toolboxes, or their individual components, to some type of mean-
ingful measurement. Without some way to measure city resiliency indi-
cators, cities do not know whether their policies are achieving desired 
outcomes. 
Measurable data and information, however, are the keys to better 
policy making and implementation. An index offers “an empirical foun-
                                                                                                                           
PERFORMANCE INDEX AND PILOT TREND]; Liesel Ashley Ritchie & Duane A. Gill, The Role of 
Community Capitals in Disaster Recovery, RISK INSTITUTE 1 (2011), 
http://www.riskinstitute.org/peri/images/file/symposiums/Community_Recovery_from_Disast
er/social,%20day%203.pdf (focusing on how communities promote resiliency pre and post-
disaster by considering their capacity in seven “capital” areas: “natural, built (physical), fi-
nancial (economic), human, social, political, and cultural.”); Susan L. Cutter et al., A Place-
Based Model for Understanding Community Resilience to Natural Disasters, 18 GLOBAL 
ENVTL. CHANGE 598, 601 (2008), available at 
http://people.oregonstate.edu/~hammerr/SVI/Cutter_etal_GEC_2008.pdf (proposing the use 
of a “disaster resilience of place (DROP) model” to measure community resilience); Kathleen 
Tierney & Michel Bruneau, Conceptualizing and Measuring Resilience: A Key to Disaster 
Loss Reduction, TR NEWS 17 (May–June 2007), 
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/trnews/trnews250_p14-17.pdf (suggesting a four-factor 
framework for characterizing and measuring resilience:  robustness, redundancy, resource-
fulness, and rapidity); see also Raymond H. Brescia & Sonia Steinway, Scoring the Banks: 
Building a Behaviorally Informed Community Impact Report Card for Financial Institutions, 
18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 339, 342, 361–63 (2013) (indexes also function as effective 
tools for promoting changes in commercial business practices; the Community Impact Report 
Card (CIRC) was created to give “communities across the country . . . [the ability] to shape 
and improve the behavior of the banks that serve them by offering consumers an easy means 
to assess the quality of the bank products and services available to them.”). 
 21. See Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability at the Edge: The Opportunity and Re-
sponsibility of Local Governments to Most Effectively Plan for Natural Disaster Mitigation, 
38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10158, 10158 (2008) (suggesting that local govern-
ments’ vulnerability to natural hazards can be largely mitigated through forward-looking 
land use planning that incorporates strict compliance with federal and state hazard mitiga-
tion laws); John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation Through Land Use Strategies, 23 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 959, 963–64 (2006) (asserting that state legislatures “have delegated to [local 
governments] the principal legal authority to determine how much and what type of devel-
opment may be built in disaster-prone areas” and that local governments should “use this 
same legal authority to develop the adaptive capacity to conduct land use planning that 
builds centers and neighborhoods, increases their tax base, provides for needed transporta-
tion and other infrastructure, provides affordable housing and jobs, prevents stormwater 
runoff, protects coastal environments, preserves wetlands and habitats, and accomplishes a 
host of other land use objectives”); see also Margaret E. Byerly, A Report to the IPCC on 
Research Connecting Human Settlements, Infrastructure, and Climate Change, 28 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 936, 936–37 (2011) (enumerating specific criteria for sustainable city design); 
Anna K. Schwab & David J. Brower, Increasing Resilience to Natural Hazards: Obstacles 
and Opportunities for Local Governments Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, 38 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10171, 10173–74 (2008) (suggesting five general action 
strategies that local governments could follow to mitigate disaster risk). 
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dation for policy analysis and a context for evaluating performance.”22 
As several authors note, the benefits of a data-driven, measurable, 
transparent index are legion, and include: providing a map showing 
where we are; driving decision-making and debate about community 
goals; identifying current problems and priority issues; establishing a 
baseline for performance comparisons; highlighting successful policy 
models; benchmarking how close a jurisdiction is to achieving certain 
goals; tracking management trends; inspiring rigorous, transparent da-
ta collection; and serving as a yardstick for citizens by giving them fig-
ures that show actual results.23 
It should be noted that the ultimate objective of a City Resilience 
Index is to fashion an easy-to-read, straightforward policy tool that can 
be applied to judge the relative resilience of cities on, and across, a vari-
ety of levels; not as a blunt instrument for public shaming.24 Neverthe-
less, a properly calibrated index will, as an inevitable byproduct, reveal 
programs that are effective as well as highlight areas where policies 
need to be curtailed and funding redeployed.25 More importantly for the 
purposes of this paper, a City Resilience Index focuses pre- and post-
disaster government decisions regarding where and how government 
manpower and resources should be invested. And in post-disaster con-
texts, where housing recovery is often driven initially by private sector 
efforts, a City Resilience Index offers non-profit and philanthropic enti-
ties a framework for targeting their grant funds and organizational re-
sources to bolster cities in key areas that may be compromised.26 
II. THE NEED FOR A CITY RESILIENCE INDEX. 
Imagine your hometown’s cityscape following a disaster, such as an 
earthquake or hurricane. Or, consider what that city might look like 
                                                     
 22. YALE CTR. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y ET AL., 2008 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
INDEX 8 (2008), available at http://www.yale.edu/epi/files/2008EPI_Text.pdf [hereinafter 
2008 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX]. 
 23. See GERKEN, supra note 19, at 29, 64–65; 2008 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
INDEX, supra note 22, at 12. 
 24. See infra Section II. 
 25. See 2008 Environmental Performance Index, supra note 22, at 12. 
 26. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita exposed a fundamental lack of cooperation be-
tween and among the city’s non-profit, philanthropic, financial services, and local govern-
ment organizations. In the wake of the storm and an arduous period of long-term recovery, 
each of these communities has agreed in principle that they can achieve more by acting in 
consort. See URBAN FOCUS LLC, CAPITAL ABSORPTION IN NEW ORLEANS 3 (2013) (copy on file 
with the authors). Sponsored by the Greater New Orleans Foundation, the Ford Foundation, 
Living Cities, and Harvard University’s Initiative for Responsible Investment, New Orleans-
based representatives from each of these critical community development stakeholders have 
come together with the common understanding that “[t]he strategic use of public, philan-
thropic, and private capital can provide a clear path forward for future capital deployment 
and lead revitalization of key corridors.”  See id.      
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with its blocks pocked by vacant and abandoned homes and buildings. A 
map might be helpful as a damage assessment report, enabling you to 
understand the scope of the city’s damage or blight. The map might also 
identify potential targets for recovery and revitalization. We have seen 
these maps on the pages of the New York Times, The Wall Street Jour-
nal, and several other newspapers depicting the story of disaster and 
crisis.27 
A typical map, however, cannot capture information about the po-
tential capacities and limitations of a city’s or state’s staff, its laws, its 
policies, and its for-profit and non-profit institutions. A map merely fix-
es physical targets for redevelopment and revitalization. A City Resili-
ence Index can serve as a tool for describing whether a city or state can 
deliver meaningful assistance to a target neighborhood, block, or com-
munity of people, such as low-income renters.28 An index is a tool for city 
redevelopment partners working on the frontlines of important initia-
tives to revitalize a city.29 Federal and state governments, as well as the 
philanthropic and non-profit entities working to help communities re-
cover from disaster or crisis, such as New Orleans’ experience following 
Hurricane Katrina, could have more efficiently and expediently de-
ployed assistance to Gulf Coast communities if they had basic infor-
mation regarding the strengths and weaknesses of local government 
partners. 
The federal government’s allocation of long-term recovery funds to 
the Gulf Coast, Louisiana, and New Orleans was unprecedented.30 Un-
fortunately, the federal government dispensed the long-term recovery 
funds without any objective tool to measure how effectively, efficiently, 
or equitably state and local governments could move the federal funds.31 
                                                     
 27. See, e.g., Adam Nossiter, Largely Alone, Pioneers Reclaim New Orleans, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 2, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/02/us/nationalspecial/02orleans.html?pagewanted=all&_r=
0 (mapping current housing occupation levels in the city’s neighborhood) [hereinafter Largely 
Alone, Pioneers Reclaim New Orleans]; In New Orleans, Businesses Take First Steps Back, 
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 17, 2005, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D06E0DF1F31F934A2575AC0A9639C8B63 
(showing eight maps furnishing detailed information regarding the location of banks, hotels, 
universities, and hospitals that remained closed or had reopened in the weeks following Hur-
ricane Katrina). 
 28. See 2008 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX, supra note 22, at 12. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See generally Victor B. Flatt & Jeffrey J. Stys, Long Term Recovery in Disaster 
Response and the Role of Non-Profits, in DISASTERS AND SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES 216–217 (Su-
san Sterett ed., 2013) (examining the inadequacy of the legal framework of disaster response 
in long-term disaster recovery). 
 31. The federal government has historically maintained expertise in furnishing 
short-term or emergency aid in the wake of disasters, but until recently it has had less expe-
rience partnering with state and local governments to navigate the multi-year path to long-
term recovery. See id. at 216 (stating that “[c]ompared to short term efforts, long term recov-
ery is considered the weaker link in the recovery picture” and that “long term recovery has 
historically not been planned comprehensively at the federal level.”). Hurricane Katrina 
exposed this federal shortcoming for managing long-term recovery. Id.  
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In the heat of the continuing humanitarian, environmental, and politi-
cal crisis, Congress and HUD did not have time to ‘kick the tires’ or look 
‘under the hood’ of the Gulf Coast jurisdictions that would ultimately 
receive federal funds.32 They had little other than anecdotal information 
about questions that would be vital in determining how a successful 
long-term recovery would proceed.33 They likely had no objective infor-
mation on the practical questions that would ultimately have a major 
influence on the City of New Orleans’ slow post-Katrina recovery: does a 
local government have a functional redevelopment authority, land bank, 
housing office, land trust, or community development agency? Does the 
redevelopment authority have experience acquiring and disposing of 
large volumes of properties? Does the housing office have a housing plan 
developed in conjunction with local stakeholders that sets priorities for 
meeting a community’s housing needs? Does the city support any local 
community development financial institutions devoted to helping bring 
about important community development projects? Does the city’s com-
munity development agency have a procurement policy that meets local, 
state, and federal requirements? Do city agencies have a history of com-
plying with federal regulatory requirements for environmental review, 
wage and hour thresholds, relocation, or civil rights laws? 
Designing and implementing long-term recovery efforts might be 
more effective and less a matter of guesswork if federal, state, and local 
governments could understand the challenges and capacities of the local 
governments that they must assist. It is not good enough to have an an-
ecdotal understanding of the challenges faced by local governments. 
There should be a more detailed evaluation of the range of community 
resources—governmental and non-governmental—that will figure criti-
cally in implementation of any long-term disaster recovery efforts. Fed-
eral and state governments should have a pre-disaster ‘picture’ of local 
government capacity. 
A City Resilience Index can provide that valuable snapshot.34 The 
goal of this index project is to provide cities, states, and national gov-
ernments with a well calibrated tool they can use to evaluate whether a 
city is in a position to pull the many levers of the machine of long-term 
recovery as opposed to having to endure the time-consuming, expensive, 
and frustrating process of inventing the long-term recovery machinery 
necessary to heal a city and help it thrive.35 A City Resilience Index 
could be composed of dozens of factors. In this article we sketch out how 
this Index might look for just two factors critical to cities nationally and 
                                                     
 32. See id. at 221–222.   
 33. See id. at 217–218. 
 34. See generally 2008 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX, supra note 22, at 12. 
 35. See generally id. 
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internationally: housing development and the preservation of cultural 
and historic resources. 
Designing and producing a City Resilience Index represents a ma-
jor undertaking.36 Think about cities and how they encompass a wide 
range of essential systems and resources. Each system is critical to the 
daily lives of residents, businesses, visitors, and major stakeholder insti-
tutions. If one browses a local government’s homepage listing for its ma-
jor departments, the website covers many of these critical systems, or at 
least important parts of them: cable television, fire, police, parks & rec-
reation, planning & development, solid waste, wastewater, and water—
just to name a handful.37 A thriving city sustains all of these systems—
or it creates partnerships to sustain them.38 Failure to administer any 
one of these systems following a disaster critically impedes that city’s 
long-term recovery from the crisis event.39 
Ideally, a City Resilience Index would take the pulse of each of 
these key city systems.40 Professor Heather Gerken’s efforts to lay 
groundwork for the Democracy Index illustrate the challenge of a resili-
ent cities indexing enterprise.41 The Democracy Index represents a tool 
for improving just a single critical system: the government elections sys-
tem.42 To meaningfully improve and inform local government election 
policies, Gerken suggests three separate index metrics.43 But she em-
phasizes that the Democracy Index’s power to spur election policy im-
provements depends largely on the finer points of defining and collecting 
appropriate data for these metrics.44 In other words, the process and 
resources involved in building even a ‘single system’ index are formida-
ble. Imagining a City Resilience Index that covers multiple city systems 
looms as an enormous undertaking. 
We think this project is worth pursuing because a City Resilience 
Index potentially provides a much bigger ‘carrot’ and promises a much 
larger and more effective ‘stick’ than even the Democracy Index. There 
are at least three critical properties that give the Democracy Index such 
powerful potential force to drive change: (1) the looming threat of expos-
ing poorly performing local election operations45 (the ‘stick’); (2) the abil-
ity to highlight the work of effective local government election staffs46 
(the ‘carrot’); and (3) the capacity to give the public easy-to-understand 
                                                     
 36. See GERKEN, supra note 19, at 5–6. 
 37. See, e.g., Department Descriptions, CITY OF TAMPA, 
http://www.tampagov.net/department_list_webapp/departments.aspx (last visited April 24, 
2014). 
 38. See infra Section III. 
 39. See infra Section III. 
 40. See 2008 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX, supra note 22, at 12. 
 41. See GERKEN, supra note 19, at 5–6. 
 42. Id. at 66. 
 43. Id. at 28. 
 44. See id. at 28–29. 
 45. See id. at 82–86. 
 46. Id. at 80–81. 
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information that it can use to advocate for better election administra-
tion.47 A City Resilience Index uses these same three vectors to propel 
change. But it also taps at least two additional forces for change and 
better public policy. 
First, the City Resilience Index helps measure a local government’s 
likely aptitude for carrying out essential city building tasks.48 This City 
Resilience Index also gives the federal government important infor-
mation about the type of technical assistance it may need to supply to 
assist local governments to develop essential city building capacities.49 
In the event of disaster, the measurement also gives federal and state 
governments critical intelligence about the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of local governments so that federal and state governments 
can calibrate their response to address needs they know local govern-
ments cannot handle.50 Further, as was so well documented following 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, non-profit and philanthropic funders are 
often the first entities ready to open their wallets to jump start long-
term neighborhood and city rebuilding efforts.51 However, these non-
profit and philanthropic funders usually have minimal insight into the 
relative sophistication and functionality of the local government. They 
have no sense of whether they will be funding a short-term band-aid 
until a high-functioning local government assumes full control of long-
term recovery efforts. Or, in the case of New Orleans, non-profits and 
philanthropic groups have no appreciation for the fact that they may 
supply the principal “boots on the ground,” not just for weeks or months, 
but for a period of years following a disaster.52 Immediate disaster re-
sponse and the challenging road to long-term recovery require deep, 
continuous, and far-reaching coordination among local, state, and feder-
al government partners. 
It is extremely difficult to establish coherent boundaries between 
index categories that have a legal effect and those that may be less legal 
in nature. We have, for example, decided to exclude considerations that 
might fit more naturally into the finance category of a resilient cities 
index. This category would include indicators such as the local govern-
ment’s bond rating, the amount of its annual debt service as a propor-
tion of its total annual budget, or the average length of time it takes a 
                                                     
 47. GERKEN, supra note 19, at 68. 
 48. See Sherwood, supra note 13.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.   
 51. When the Cameras Stop Rolling, Nonprofits Remain, THIRD SECTOR: NEW 
ENGLAND,  
http://www.tsne.org/site/c.ghLUK3PCLoF/b.1424995/k.1D68/Articles__Nonprofits_Response_
to_Katrina.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
 52. See, e.g., Ellen Freudenheim, Volunteering to Help Rebuild New Orleans, 
ELLENFREUDENHEIM.COM, http://ellenfreudenheim.com/articles/travel/usa/volunteering-to-
help-rebuild-new-orleans/ (last visited April 24, 2014). 
60 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
city to pay its outside contractors.53 We have also decided to exclude in-
dicators that would fall into the category of customer satisfaction or pro-
cess improvement. It is not hard to see how a city’s commitment (or lack 
thereof) to improving its public interface affects delivery of housing and 
historic preservation services.54 If they have not done so already, we 
suggest to our colleagues in the field of public administration that (a) 
public finance and (b) public sector customer service are two critical cat-
egories for a larger City Resilience Index. A city in which residents are 
unhappy, finances are questionable, and local business partners are dis-
gruntled will struggle.55 Residents, businesses, and service providers 
operate as indispensable partners in helping cities run efficiently and 
rebuild quickly. If local government finance systems are efficient and its 
customer service systems are fair and timely, chances are, they are more 
likely to improve their neighborhoods and seek out local government 
contracts.56 
III. BUILDING THE INDEX: FIRST THOUGHTS ON CITY 
RESILIENCE INDICATORS 
Profoundly traumatic and destructive experiences associated with 
Katrina, Sandy, or any other major disaster are wasted if all that is ex-
pected of government-led relief is a band-aid to mend an injured com-
munity. Disasters generally expose what is not working correctly in a 
community. Although no two cities are identical, their general strengths 
and their dysfunctions likely share some common DNA. Thus, disaster 
recovery is not only about rebuilding cities stronger than they were be-
                                                     
 53. A city that is unable to pay its contractors in a timely manner under normal, 
non-urgent circumstances will face enormous challenges post-disaster complying with de-
tailed federal requirements for documenting recovery work completed.  See Michelle Krupa, 
Companies That Helped N.O. Getting Paid 2 Years Later, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Oct. 12, 
2009, 11:22 PM), http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2008/03/companies_that_helped 
_no_getti.html.  See also, THE PUBLIC STRATEGIES GRP., CITY OF NEW ORLEANS: A 
TRANSFORMATION PLAN FOR CITY GOVERNMENT 2, 6, 8 (Mar. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.nola.gov/chief-administrative-office/documents/nola_transformation_plan/.  Soon 
after taking over City Hall from former Mayor C. Ray Nagin, Mayor Mitchell Landrieu’s 
administration retained an outside consultant to provide the City with recommendation for 
reforming how the City does its day-to-day business. On the subject of paying outside con-
tractors, the consultant did not mince words, noting that “[a]s everyone knows, New Orleans 
. . . has great trouble paying its bills on time. Solving that problem would improve the city’s 
image with the business and nonprofit community, while helping the city hire better contrac-
tors, faster (since many will not now compete for city work because the city pays so slowly).” 
See id. at 19. 
 54. For example, does a local government offer “one-stop shopping” or streamlined 
permitting for building and other development permits? See THE PUBLIC STRATEGIES GRP., 
supra note 53, at 11. 
 55. But cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in 
Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 945 (1988) (Professor Gillette describes the 
theoretical proclivity of individuals to choose where they live based on the package of ser-
vices offered by local government, noting that “municipalities provide packages of goods or 
services, the total of which attracts potential residents”). 
 56. THE PUBLIC STRATEGIES GRP., supra note 53, at 8. 
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fore a disaster event, but also about taking note of a city’s relative 
strengths and weaknesses, and spreading the word to other cities to 
help make them stronger—regardless of whether those cities should face 
any immediate peril from hurricane, tsunami, tornado, wildfire, or 
earthquake. 
Disaster events such as Katrina and Sandy are not just cautionary 
tales. They allow us to distill the local government’s experiences down to 
factors that helped the city adapt to, and overcome, adversity. At the 
same time, we see a city’s unattractive underbelly. We have the chance 
to assess the factors whose absence or near-absence may have hobbled 
the city before disaster and then left the city in a poor position to re-
bound post-disaster.57 If we can isolate these critical factors and then 
find a way of meaningfully measuring their presence in cities, then we 
will have a tool that allows for a constructive dialogue about how to 
build and sustain resilient cities. 
Drawing on lessons of recent catastrophic disasters, Part III of this 
article suggests critical legal indicators that can be used to build strong-
er cities. Part III(A) outlines the legal index indicators that might be 
used to analyze the relative vitality of cities’ housing programs. Part 
III(B) delineates the factors that may be helpful in assessing state and 
city programs that promote the preservation of historic and cultural re-
















Housing plan or strategy 
adopted by local government 
(housing plan developed in 
conjunction with local stake-
holders that sets priorities 
for meeting a community’s 
housing needs) 
                                                     
 57. See, e.g., Amy Liu, Rebirth on the Bayou:  Lessons from New Orleans and the 
Gulf Coast, BROOKINGS (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-
avenue/posts/2011/08/26-resilience-hurricane-liu (“Like Japan and its resurgent qualms over 
nuclear energy or Haiti with its government so weak it can’t serve those in need, Katrina 
and the levee failure exposed all that was badly broken in New Orleans.”). 
 58. In preparing this preliminary table of resilient city index categories and indica-
tors, the authors’ framework has been strongly influenced by the template supplied by the 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI).  See 2008 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX, 
supra note 22.  
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Duly procured agreements 
with Local or Regional Non-
profit (CDCs, philanthropic 
organizations, etc.) and/or 
For-profit Housing Develop-
ers to Rehabilitate or Con-
struct Affordable Housing At 
Scale (10 or more units)  






Duly authorized property 
acquisition through two or 
more legal tools for property 
acquisition, including private 
market purchases, eminent 
domain, code lien foreclosure, 
and land swaps (local gov-
ernment must follow local, 
state and federal require-
ments for acquiring property, 
including environmental re-
view and appraisal require-





Technology – GIS Da-
tabase 
Information on location of 
historic properties incorpo-
rated into state and/or city 
database 
 Technology – Social 
Media Interface  
City or state-maintained por-
tal to gather information and 
comments on individual his-
toric properties 
 Regulatory —   
Streamlined Review 
Processes 
State or city streamlined 
regulations integrating the 
environmental and historic 
resources review processes 
 
A. Resilience Index Indicators for Housing 
In this initial version of the City Resilience Index, the housing cat-
egory includes just a single subcategory: the Local Government Housing 
Development “Toolbox.” The housing category would likely be expanded 
to multiple subcategories as work continued on this Index. For instance, 
at least one of the additional housing subcategories would likely cover 
the legal landscape for redevelopment activities.59 
                                                     
 59. A housing subcategory focusing on the legal landscape for redevelopment activi-
ties might assess potential external obstacles to, and assets for, housing development pro-
grams. Each city must do the work of housing and neighborhood development in a distinctly 
 
2014] URBAN WRECKAGE AND RESILIENCY: ARTICULATING 
A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRESERVING, 
RECONSTRUCTING, AND BUILDING CITIES 
63 
 
The Housing Development “Toolbox” subcategory evaluates the im-
portant housing development “levers” or “pulleys” that a local govern-
ment has, or should have, at its disposal. This subcategory focuses on 
legal strategies and partnerships that tend to sustain and promote safe 
and affordable housing. Keep in mind that the Index does not serve 
merely as an inventory or checklist. The Index aims to measure whether 
local governments use these important housing development tools as 
well as the level of sophistication and the capacity at which they are be-
ing used. 
i. Local Government Housing Development “Toolbox” 
City dwellers want to go home to safe neighborhoods with well-
maintained houses or apartment buildings. Although private real estate 
development interests drive a large share of a city’s residential housing 
development, local governments, in partnership with state and federal 
governments, can play a vital role in promoting development and af-
fordable housing options.60 Cities not only contribute land or vacant 
buildings for these housing initiatives, but they often make financial 
investments in housing development and redevelopment, providing the 
critical gap financing that allows the projects to proceed.61 
Local and state governments can play an even larger role during 
long-term disaster recovery. A catastrophic disaster may destroy tens of 
                                                                                                                           
local context. For that reason, cities often have a unique history of partnering with the feder-
al government to create and preserve housing assets. See ALAN MALLACH, STABILIZING 
COMMUNITIES:  A FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE SECONDARY IMPACTS OF THE FORECLOSURE 
CRISIS 3 (Feb. 2009), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2009/02_foreclosure_crisis_mallach.aspx. Some partner-
ships have been more positive and constructive than others. See e.g., PARTNERSHIP FOR 
SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, Case Studies, 
http://www.sustainablecommunities.gov/studies.html (last visited April 24, 2014). The feder-
al relationship is just one facet of the multi-layered housing development landscape. Peter 
W. Salsich, Saving Our Cities: What Role Should the Federal Government Play?, 36 URB. 
LAW. 475, 504 (2004). Housing development strategies are also dictated by numerous state 
and local laws as well as the existence—or not—of active state, local, non-profit, and philan-
thropic institutions. See Becker, supra note 9. Any of these factors can enrich or dampen a 
city’s development climate. Embedded in the landscape of laws and community organizations 
or institutions in which a local government pursues its housing goals are potential pitfalls 
that could frustrate its efforts as well as springboards that could augment those efforts. A 
future, more detailed, analysis of the housing category, might thus attempt to measure the 
important influence of the surrounding legal environment on a resilient housing sector. 
 60. See NYC: THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NYC Affordable 
Housing Resource Center, http://www.nyc.gov/html/housinginfo/html/home/home.shtml (last 
visited April 24, 2014). 
 61. See NYC: THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NYC Recovery: 
Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/cdbg/html/home/home.shtml (last visited April 24, 2014). 
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thousands of homes.62 Many families will have no insurance or insuffi-
cient insurance coverage.63 Federal disaster block grant dollars supply 
states and cities with funds for rebuilding neighborhoods where there is 
an urgent need, such as a disaster, or the need to build housing for low- 
and moderate-income families.64 
It is not, however, safe to assume that different local governments 
possess comparable tools to promote neighborhood housing develop-
ment. One local government’s housing development experience may be 
largely limited to selling vacant properties to Habitat for Humanity for 
single-family housing construction. Another local government may have 
significant experience layering federal grants with federal tax credits 
and private foundation dollars. One city may not be able to find enough 
capable low-and moderate-income housing developers to spend the city’s 
annual allocation of federal block grant funds, while a different city may 
enjoy intense competition for federal grant monies. 
Under normal, non-urgent circumstances, it may make little differ-
ence to all but the city’s poorest residents whether a local government 
effectively manages its federally funded housing programs. The level of 
interest in the local government’s ability to spend federal grant funds 
efficiently increases dramatically following disasters.65 Suddenly, the 
fortunes of residents of every disaster-ravaged neighborhood, regardless 
                                                     
 62. Hurricane Sandy damaged or destroyed more than 650,000 homes. U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, HURRICANE SANDY 
REBUILDING STRATEGY: STRONGER COMMUNITIES, A RESILIENT REGION 13 (Aug. 2013), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2013/HUD
No.13-125 (follow “Read the full Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy” hyperlink to down-
load pdf.).  
 63. The 2005 hurricane season damaged an astounding 66,609 of 87,589 owner oc-
cupied housing units in the City of New Orleans, which represents 76% of owner-occupied 
housing units. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV.’S OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND 
RESEARCH, CURRENT HOUSING UNIT DAMAGE ESTIMATES: HURRICANES KATRINA, RITA, AND 
WILMA 23 (Apr. 7, 2006), available at 
https://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/Katrina_Rita_Wilma_Damage_2_12_06___revised.
pdf. More than 38% of damaged units either had no insurance or had property insurance but 
lacked flood insurance. Id. 
 64. To comply with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s pro-
grammatic requirements, state and local governments must ensure that the projects they 
fund with CDBG dollars meet one of three required “national objectives”: Activities benefit-
ing low and moderate-income persons, activities eliminating slum and blight, and activities 
addressing urgent community development needs. See 24 C.F.R. § 570.208 (2014) (national 
objective compliance for entitlement grantees); 24 C.F.R. § 570.483 (2014) (national objective 
compliance for the states). See also U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., CDBG Disaster 
Recovery Assistance, 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevel
opment/programs/drsi (last visited April 24, 2014) (providing a summary of programmatic 
requirements for HUD’s disaster Community Development Block Grant awards, including 
the requirement that grantees satisfy one of three HUD national objectives). 
 65. Campbell Robertson, A Race for a New Mayor; a Trial for an Old One, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/us/politics/a-race-for-a-new-mayor-
a-trial-for-an-old-one.html?_r=0 (describing New Orleans’ increasingly more engaged sophis-
ticated electorate following Hurricane Katrina and the current mayor’s boast that he cleared 
the clog in the pipeline of federal recovery funds caused by the previous mayor). 
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of income, depend in some way on the aptitude and experience of state 
and local governments in facilitating housing development. A local gov-
ernment struggling for proficiency with only the most basic legal tools to 
promote housing development will be outmatched and fundamentally 
overwhelmed when disaster strikes and its neighborhoods must be re-
built.66 To be sure, it is difficult to imagine that any local government 
can easily bear the stress of post-disaster rebuilding. All city residents 
affected by disaster will encounter tremendous adversity.67 But it is the 
very low-income, low-income, moderate-income and even middle-income 
families that will have a great personal stake in the city’s ability to de-
sign, implement, and manage critical facets of the neighborhood housing 
recovery.68 
It is important for the federal government, state governments, non-
profit and philanthropic developers, and the general public to have the 
ability to gauge the capacity of the local government to promote sophis-
ticated housing development. The following three housing index indica-
tors are examples of the factors that would likely be important in de-
termining whether a local government possesses the necessary legal 
“toolkit” to pursue the sophisticated housing development that promotes 
affordable and equitable housing opportunities under non-crisis circum-
stances. This same legal toolkit is essential for confronting the enor-
mous problems that challenge a community following a disaster. A more 
mature City Resilience Index would include a number of additional 
housing indicators. 
a. Planning Tools 
When disaster strikes, almost everyone, including the chair of the 
planning board and board staff, becomes preoccupied with the steps that 
they must take personally to rebuild their homes. Thus, this is not an 
ideal time to plan for rebuilding. Rather, this is the time to mine and 
implement existing plans so that cities and their neighborhoods can ad-
dress their essential housing needs and follow guidelines that have been 
                                                     
 66. See Amy Liu, et al., Introduction, in RESILIENCE AND OPPORTUNITY: 
LESSONS FROM THE U.S. GULF COAST AFTER KATRINA AND RITA (Amy Liu et al. 
eds., 2011). 
 67. See Raymond H. Brescia et al., Crisis Management: Principles that Should 
Guide the Disposition of Federally Owned, Foreclosed Properties, 45 IND. L. REV. 305, 328, 
328 n.196 (2012) (explaining that Katrina’s floodwaters hit low-lying, low-income neighbor-
hoods hardest, but that those waters “devastated the lives of all New Orleanians, destroying 
their homes or school or churches and depriving many of their jobs”). 
 68. See John Marshall, Weathering NEPA Review: Superstorms and Super Slow 
Urban Recovery, Vol. 41, No. 1 ECOLOGY. L. Q. __ (forthcoming 2014) (describing that “[w]ith 
a few notable exceptions, the neighborhoods that endured the most severe flooding were 
home to lower- and middle-income African American families” and that the lengthy regulato-
ry and administrative delays in implementing the city’s long-term recovery strategy meant 
that these same neighborhoods recovered most slowly). 
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carefully developed to make sure the next generation of housing devel-
opment is stronger, greener, safer, and more affordable. 
The housing category of the City Resilience Index should include at 
least one indicator for assessing whether local governments have plans 
in place to address the adversities presented by disasters.69 This index 
indicator would credit cities for adopting comprehensive plans and pro-
cedures for updating those plans on a regular basis. Enhanced index 
scores will be possible for jurisdictions that have adopted a comprehen-
sive plan with a housing component that includes detailed goals and 
objectives for developing housing to serve the city’s very low-income and 
low-income families.70 Such goals and objectives might include specific 
plans and strategies for moving families out of harm’s way in the event 
of disaster and allowing for higher-density development in areas that 
are considered safer. 
There are three reasons why it is critical for City Resilience Index’s 
housing category to include a planning indicator. First, it cannot be tak-
en for granted that all local governments have housing plans or policies. 
When Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, New Orleans did not have a 
housing policy—not even a policy that could have been modified in the 
wake of Katrina.71 Second, plans stake out a path and priorities for or-
derly development prior to the chaos of crisis.72 If a local government 
                                                     
 69. See Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability at the Edge: The Opportunity and Re-
sponsibility of Local Governments to Most Effectively Plan for Natural Disaster Mitigation, 
38 ENVTL L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10158, 10159 (2008) (Professor Salkin urges that one 
important way we can help diminish vulnerability at the local level is by making sure that 
the requirements of federal and state hazard mitigation laws are: (a) incorporated in local 
comprehensive plans and (b) implemented “through local land use planning and zoning 
techniques.”). 
 70. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development defines low-income 
families as those whose income does not exceed 80% of the area median income (AMI). See 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, FY 2014 HUD 
INCOME LIMITS BRIEFING MATERIAL, HUDUSER.ORG 1 (Dec. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/il/il14/IncomeLimitsBriefingMaterial_FY14_v2.pdf. 
A very low-income family earns no more than 50% of AMI. See id. For example, in 2014, the 
median family income for a New Orleans family of four is $58,800.00. See 2014 MTSP 
INCOME LIMITS REPORT, NOVOGRADAC AFFORDABLE HOUS. RES. CTR. (2014), available at 
http://www.novoco.com/low_income_housing/resource_files/income_limits/2014_mtsp_income
_limits_report_121813.pdf. A family of four earning 60% of the New Orleans AMI is earning 
$35,280.00. See id. 
 71. See TRANSITION NEW ORLEANS TASK FORCE, HOUSING 28 (Apr. 2010), available 
at http://www.policylink.org/atf/cf/{97c6d565-bb43-406d-a6d5-
eca3bbf35af0}/MAYOR'S%20HOUSING%20TASKFORCE.PDF. (More than four-and-a-half 
years following Katrina, the City of New Orleans still had not developed a comprehensive 
housing plan to guide post-disaster housing investments.); see also ROBERT B. OLSHANSKY & 
LAURIE A. JOHNSON, CLEAR AS MUD:  PLANNING FOR THE REBUILDING OF NEW ORLEANS 236 
(American Planning Ass’n 2010) (noting that “[p]rior to Katrina, the city lacked a formal 
neighborhood planning program and was perceived to be insensitive to citizen views. Fur-
thermore, it lacked an up-to-date comprehensive plan, and the zoning ordinance was obso-
lete.”). 
 72. See OLSHANSKY, supra note 71, at 236 (commenting that “[t]he difficulties of 
postdisaster recovery are arguments for doing planning all the time.  Planning anticipates 
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has adopted and updated a comprehensive plan, then that document 
gives the local government basis for making tough or even unpopular 
redevelopment decisions following disasters. In the wake of a cata-
strophic disaster, the local governments implementing the recovery 
strategy generally should not be expected to make tough decisions re-
garding a rebuilding triage process.73 In other words, local governments 
often face political pressures not to adopt redevelopment priorities that 
make long-term recovery more sustainable and feasible by prioritizing 
or circumscribing neighborhood recovery.74 The City of New Orleans is-
sued building permits immediately after the storm for every neighbor-
hood in the City—even the lowest lying neighborhoods that sat in the 
shadow of failed floodwalls.75 Further, the City did not initially require 
homeowners to elevate their homes as a condition of receiving a building 
permit.76 Third, housing plans and policies should protect the interests 
of low- and moderate-income residents who are most vulnerable follow-
ing a disaster and who face the greatest housing needs. In New Orleans, 
55% of damaged homes were rental units and 20% of those units 
(16,000) were affordable to extremely low-income households.77 Low-
                                                                                                                           
how to manage change and prepares local governments for decisions that will arise in the 
future. It is best to prepare for these things in normal times when heads are calmer.”). 
 73. Hurricane Katrina precipitated a contentious debate about how the city should 
be rebuilt and who should decide which neighborhoods should be resettled. See Lawrence N. 
Powell, What Does American History Tell Us about Katrina and Vice Versa?, 94 J.  AM. HIST. 
863, 863–76 (Dec. 2007), available at 
http://journalofamericanhistory.org/projects/katrina/Powell.html. Ultimately, the City of New 
Orleans rejected the idea of a building moratorium in some neighborhoods and chose not to 
place any restrictions on rebuilding.  Adam Nossiter, Rebuilding New Orleans, One Appeal 
at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/national/nationalspecial/05rebuild.html?pagewanted=all 
[hereinafter Rebuilding New Orleans, One Appeal at a Time]. 
 74. See OLSHANSKY, supra note 71, at 37–71 (narrating in detail the City of New 
Orleans’ six month effort to craft a plan for rebuilding the city and recounting the intense 
disagreement between factions that wished to shrink the city’s footprint and those that saw 
such efforts as a veiled attempt to prevent African Americans from returning to the city to 
rebuild). 
 75. See Rebuilding New Orleans, One Appeal at a Time, supra note 73. 
 76. See Brad Heath, Rebuilt N.O. Homes At Risk Without Required Elevation, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 19, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-09-18-home-
elevation_N.htm (reporting that federal investigators determined that the City of New Orle-
ans allowed as many as 2300 homeowners rebuild without elevating their homes as required 
by applicable federal flood insurance regulations).  
 77. See Kalima Rose, Bringing New Orleans Home: Community, Faith, and Non-
profit Driven Housing Recovery, in RESILIENCE AND OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE U.S. 
GULF COAST AFTER KATRINA AND RITA 99, 113 (Amy Liu et al. eds., 2011). Katrina not only 
struck with historic force, it struck at the heart of one of the nation’s poorest communities. 
See Amy Liu, et al., Introduction, in RESILIENCE AND OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE U.S. 
GULF COAST AFTER KATRINA AND RITA 1, 3 (Amy Liu et al. eds., 2011).  (More than 1 million 
of the 5.8 million living in Katrina’s strike area lived in poverty).  See id. Many of the city’s 
poor residents lived in rental housing and, according to FEMA 79% of families displaced by 
Katrina were renters. See Kalima Rose, Bringing New Orleans Home: Community, Faith, 
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income renters are the people who have slim resources to ride out a 
longer-term disaster recovery. Yet these low-income renters are also the 
people who most often fill critical service industry jobs. 
b. Partnership Tools 
Constructing or rehabilitating housing is an expensive endeavor. It 
requires special expertise. To build housing at scale demands even more 
resources and greater skill. Generally speaking, if local governments 
aim to improve housing stock, then they must prove capable of partner-
ing with private and non-profit housing developers. Knowledgeable af-
fordable housing developers can, in turn, magnify the value and impact 
of local governments’ housing investments by leveraging tax credits, 
philanthropic program related investments (PRIs), bank loans, and pri-
vate capital.78 It cannot be assumed, however, that all local governments 
have this important ability to broker sophisticated housing development 
deals. 
The housing category of a City Resilience Index should include at 
least one indicator for assessing whether local governments have duly 
procured agreements with local or regional for-profit and non-profit 
housing developers that have resulted in rehabilitation or construction 
of affordable housing at scale. This Index indicator would not give credit 
to cities for arriving at agreements that fail to yield occupied housing 
units. Instead, the Index would give enhanced credit to local govern-
ments for each different developer with which it partnered. A further 
boost in scoring could be made for the number of units developed as a 
proportion of the city’s overall affordable housing units. 
There are at least two reasons why it is critical for the housing in-
dex of a City Resilience Index to include an indicator that measures lo-
cal government development partnerships. The first reason is that the 
private sector frequently spearheads long-term redevelopment efforts 
following a disaster.79 This is especially true of mission-driven non-profit 
developers who will pursue projects even when national and regional 
economic conditions push private developers largely to the sidelines; as 
                                                                                                                           
and Nonprofit Driven Housing Recovery, in RESILIENCE AND OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM 
THE U.S. GULF COAST AFTER KATRINA AND RITA 99, 110–11 (Amy Liu et al. eds., 2011). The 
levee failures caused by Katrina flooded over half of New Orleans rental housing units. See 
153 CONG. REC.S8064–65 (June 20, 2007) (statements Sens. Dodd and Landrieu).      
 78. Foundations and non-profit housing development partners figured centrally in 
pushing New Orleans’ long-term recovery forward. The Greater New Orleans Foundation 
raised $25 million following Katrina to promote housing redevelopment and strengthen the 
city’s network of non-profit housing developers. See GREATER NEW ORLEANS FOUNDATION ET 
AL., CAPITAL ABSORPTION IN NEW ORLEANS 3 (Sept. 2013) (copy on file with the authors). 
This fund leveraged over $120 million in additional investments.  See id.     
 79. See Bill Bynum, Rebuilding New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, GREEN MONEY, 
http://www.greenmoneyjournal.com/archives/winter-2011-2012/rebuilding-new-orleans-and-
the-gulf-coast/ (last visited April 24, 2014) (explaining that the Gulf Coast’s recovery has 
proceeded forward with private and non-profits investments and innovations, including ad-
vances in housing, retail, food, and personal finance). 
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was the case for a long period during the Katrina recovery.80 A firm that 
has a good track record developing affordable housing under normal cir-
cumstances could emerge as a strong candidate for a development part-
nership when the local government is responsible for deploying tens of 
millions in housing recovery funds following a disaster. The second rea-
son is that a city’s failure to support and cultivate a community of pub-
lic, private, and non-profit housing development organizations—which 
would lead to a low score in that part of the index—represents a critical 
deficit of which federal and state governments should be aware. For in-
stance, New Orleans was not well positioned to address demands of 
long-term recovery because the city could point to few entities capable of 
doing housing redevelopment work.81 This is critical because, for rede-
velopment of low and moderate-income housing following disasters, 
there is a need for community development entities that have some 
proven capacity to effectively use federal block grant funds as well as 
federal tax credit funding.82 
c. Property Acquisition, Disposition & Stewardship Tools 
Cultivating safe and affordable housing depends not only on the lo-
cal government’s skill at cultivating partnerships with developers and 
leveraging funds, but also its expertise for assembling residential prop-
erty, disposing of it, and monitoring its condition across a city. 
The housing category of a City Resilience Index should include at 
least one indicator for evaluating whether local governments can effec-
tively manage matters relating to residential properties, including pub-
lic health and safety code compliance and lien foreclosure. This Index 
indicator would recognize local governments for such aptitudes as: their 
demonstrated success in acquiring residential properties through timely 
and properly administered code lien foreclosure83 or eminent domain 
                                                     
 80. See Diane Glauber & David Zisser, Innovative Post-Disaster Community-Based 
Housing Strategies, in BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE POST-DISASTER 371, 375 (Dorcas 
R. Gilmore et al. eds., 2013). See also Brenda Bratton Blom and Woody Widrow, The Role of 
Nonprofits and Religious Organizations in Emergency Response, in BUILDING COMMUNITY 
RESILIENCE POST-DISASTER 133, 139–49 (Dorcas R. Gilmore et al. eds., 2013) (discussing 
broadly the contributions of international, regional, and local non-profits and religious organ-
izations to immediate and long-term Katrina recovery efforts). 
 81. See Kalima Rose, Bringing New Orleans Home: Community, Faith, and Non-
profit Driven Housing Recovery, in RESILIENCE AND OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE U.S. 
GULF COAST AFTER KATRINA AND RITA 99, 103 (Amy Liu et al. eds., 2011) (noting that before 
Katrina, New Orleans had a just a few community development organizations with the ca-
pacity to carry out neighborhood development work).  
 82. See id. 
 83. See David A. Marcello, Housing Redevelopment Strategies in the Wake of 
Katrina and Anti-Kelo Constitutional Amendments: Mapping a Path Through the Landscape 
of Disaster, 53 LOY. L. REV. 763, 817–18 (2007) (describing how “[c]ode enforcement is poten-
tially the most powerful and productive redevelopment strategy in the City’s arsenal” but 
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procedures;84 the range of real estate disposition strategies that success-
fully return residential properties to commerce, including individual 
sales; sales of multiple properties through requests for proposals; and 
property swaps with private, non-profit, or government entities.85 Addi-
tional index credits could be awarded to cities for volume of properties 
disposed. For example, the Index could award points on a sliding scale 
that measures a city’s sales of property as a percentage of the total 
number of properties sold on the private market each year in that juris-
diction and/or the value of properties sold or swapped as a percentage of 
the total value of real estate owned by the city. 
There are three reasons local government property acquisition, dis-
position, and stewardship are critical to a resilient city. The first is that 
a basic function of local government is to intervene and protect citizens 
and the neighborhoods in which they live when private market forces 
cannot eliminate persistent blight or abandonment.86 Prime causes of 
these conditions are negligent absentee owners and so-called “heirs’ 
properties,” where multiple family members own fractional interests in 
a single property due to the family’s failure to probate wills or otherwise 
administer estates.87 The second is that following disasters, cities suffer 
                                                                                                                           
lamenting that the City had failed to explore “its full potential” as a means of passing clear 
title to purchasers at code lien foreclosure auctions).  
 84. Eminent domain will generally take a leading role in any city’s comprehensive 
redevelopment efforts, but particularly in post-disaster situations. See John J. Costonis, New 
Orleans, Katrina and Kelo: American Cities in the Post-Kelo Era, 83 TUL. L. REV. 395, 401 
(2008). Large-scale urban redevelopment efforts present a range of real estate challenges. 
Among those challenges are assembling multiple parcels of property in a unified effort and 
under unified ownership, allowing clustered redevelopment of formerly occupied or aban-
doned properties, and acquiring property whose tangled title problems often prevent private 
market acquisition.  See id. at 404–06.   
 85. See Glauber & Zisser, supra note 80 at 380 (noting that consensus built follow-
ing Katrina that land swaps were a valuable tool for, among other purposes, “shrink[ing] the 
city’s footprint without destroying neighborhood integrity”).    
 86. Natural disasters and human-made catastrophes such as the mortgage foreclo-
sure crisis unravel local real estate markets in ways that demand government intervention. 
See Brescia et al., supra note 67, at 305–07. Brescia also analyzes the range of possible legal 
tools that the State of Louisiana and the City of New Orleans have to address not only the 
devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but also historic real estate market 
problems caused by blight and abandonment. Id. at 336–41. See also Gordon Russell, Faded 
Midwestern Cities Offer Ways New Orleans Could Slim Down to Match Its Smaller Popula-
tion, THE TIMES PICAYUNE, Nov. 28, 2008, 
http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2008/11/smaller_smarter_faded_midweste.html (docu-
menting New Orleans’ struggle to balance problems associated with a glut of vacant and 
abandoned properties with citizens’ interest in repopulating neighborhoods throughout the 
city, causing critics to urge that “the city needs to provide incentives to align housing supply 
with demand and avoid bad public investment strategies”).  
 87. See Heather K. Way, Informal Homeownership in the United States and the 
Law, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 113, 117–19, 151–58 (2009) (illuminating the circumstanc-
es that cause homes—particularly homes occupied by low-income families—to become tan-
gled in land title problems associated with tenancy-in-common ownership among a few or 
perhaps even hundreds of relatives). 
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widespread problems with poor upkeep of properties.88 Widespread 
blight and dilapidation of property retards citizens’ efforts to rebuild 
their neighborhoods and discourages new outside investment.89 The 
third reason that a local government’s (or in some instances a state’s) 
skill in managing real estate and overseeing code compliance is so im-
portant is that disasters force cities to employ many different real estate 
strategies across its recovering neighborhoods.90 A homeowner buyout 
strategy for redeveloping a neighborhood directly impacted by disaster 
should be tailored to the market structure; the strategy for a neighbor-
hood where the disaster undermined an already weak real estate mar-
ket should be different than the strategy for neighborhoods where the 
disaster destroyed a stable real estate market.91 Resilient cities will 
have experience using a range of real estate acquisition and disposition 
techniques. 
B. Resilience Index Indicators for Preservation of Historic and Cultural 
Resources 
Like housing, historic resources comprise a significant, core aspect 
of all cities, and historic preservation’s “matrix of laws, incentives, [and] 
policies . . . has become a fundamental tool for strengthening . . . com-
munities.”92 Cities did not somehow emerge fully formed; they developed 
gradually, usually in oscillating, uneven lurches of development over 
time.93 Indeed, a simple walk around any city reminds us that urban 
areas are vibrant, living-landscape palimpsests of our past-pockets of 
which have been preserved, rehabilitated, or revitalized. These pockets 
                                                     
 88. See, e.g., Frank S. Alexander, Louisiana Land Reform in the Storms’ Aftermath, 
53 LOY. L. REV. 727, 730-31, 734 & n.29 (2007) (“[a]ccording to the 2000 Census, New Orle-
ans had an estimated 27,000 . . . unoccupied structures” that number swelled as many as 
100,000 properties following Hurricane Katrina). 
 89. Vacant and abandoned properties have a toxic effect on surrounding homes and 
businesses.  Not only do vacant properties push down surrounding home values, but they 
also can trigger higher insurance rates. Further, when homes are abandoned and not occu-
pied, businesses have little incentive to rent or buy properties to open stores and offices.  
High levels of neighborhood abandonment cause an economic drag on the community. See, 
e.g., Implementation of the Road Home Program Four Years After Hurricane Katrina: Field 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, 
111th Cong. 95 (2009) (statement of Ommeed Sathe, Dir. of Real Estate Strategy, New Orle-
ans Redevelopment Auth.). 
 90. Brescia et al., supra note 67, at 328–35. 
 91. See id. at 330–33. 
 92. DONOVAN R. RYPKEMA ET AL., MEASURING ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION: A REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION BY 
PLACEECONOMICS vi. (2d ed. 2013), available at 
http://www.achp.gov/docs/Economic%20Impacts%20v5-FINAL.pdf. 
 93. An excellent introductory survey on the oscillating development of cities and 
towns in the United Kingdom is MICHAEL ASTON, INTERPRETING THE LANDSCAPE:  
LANDSCAPE ARCHAEOLOGY AND LOCAL HISTORY (1985). 
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of tangible memory—buildings, parks, and single-family homes to name 
a few—are critical to a city’s overall resilience and should be included in 
every City Resilience Index. Indeed, many city dwellers live in historic 
structures or housing made possible through historic preservation pro-
grams. 
In this initial version of the City Resilience Index, our discussion of 
the historic resources category is divided into two parts. For those who 
might question the inclusion of historic resources in a City Resilience 
Index at all, the first part offers a brief analysis of some of the most im-
portant benefits historic preservation brings to cities and how those 
benefits increase overall urban resilience. 
The second part delineates three important historic resources 
preservation tools that a state and/or local government should have (or 
develop) to ensure long-term resilience. This part concentrates on tech-
nological and legal strategies that promote historic preservation and 
utilize its unique capacity to foster urban resilience. As noted above, the 
City Resilience Index is designed to measure not just if state and local 
governments possess these tools, but how well they are being used. 
i. Historic and Cultural Resources Preservation and Urban Resilience 
Scholars have long noted the numerous benefits that flow from pre-
serving historic and cultural resources.94 The most important of these 
from a resiliency standpoint is that historic resource preservation is a 
powerful, broad-based impetus for economic development. For instance, 
the most recent statistics from the National Park Service reveal that, in 
2012, economic impacts related to the federal historic preservation tax 
credit—a 20% credit for qualifying rehabilitation expenditures—
accounted for the creation of approximately 58,000 jobs, generated $3.4 
billion in gross domestic product (GDP), and produced over $2.5 billion 
in income.95 Just as important as the dollar figures, many of the 744 
certified rehabilitated buildings that leveraged this credit in 2012 were 
“abandoned or underutilized, and all were in need of substantial reha-
bilitation to return them to, or for their continued, economic viability.”96 
Several of these rehabilitated buildings reside in older urban cores and 
have breathed new life into once derelict domains.97 
Detailed research regarding the economic benefits of historic re-
source preservation in states and localities also reveals that it is a po-
tent economic driver. In Georgia, for example, heritage tourism sustains 
117,000 jobs, generates roughly $204 million in wages, and levies $210 
                                                     
 94. See, e.g., SARA BRONIN & RYAN ROWBERRY, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL (forthcoming publication 2014) (manuscript on file with the author). 
 95. NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL HISTORIC TAX CREDIT FOR FY 2012, at 3, 5 (2013), avail-
able at http://www.nps.gov/tps/tax-incentives/taxdocs/economic-impact-2013.pdf. 
 96. Id. at 1. 
 97. Id. at 15. 
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million in local taxes on an annual basis.98 For the decade 2000–2010, 
the rehabilitation of historic resources in Georgia (usually buildings) 
resulted in 10,168 local jobs and over $420 million in income for Georgia 
workers and proprietors.99 Analyses of the economic impacts of historic 
resource preservation for Utah, Connecticut, Delaware, and Florida tell 
similar stories: historic preservation creates local jobs; revitalizes older 
neighborhoods; enhances local sustainability measures; adds needed 
affordable housing; boosts local taxes; and provides a powerful source of 
local revenue.100 Historic preservation is thus a key component in spur-
ring the economic revitalization and resilience of older communities in 
metropolitan areas, cities, and towns. 
Historic resource preservation also has a powerful, positive effect 
on mental health and the ability of people to cope with change—traits 
that are desperately needed during a disaster event. Pioneering studies 
in England have found that adults and teenagers who live in areas with 
higher concentrations of historic buildings are more likely to have a 
stronger sense of place.101 This reinforced sense of place has many posi-
tive benefits on self-esteem and identity, which in turn lead to stronger, 
more civically engaged communities.102 English researchers also discov-
ered a positive, significant link between the historic environment and 
social capital—the bonds that connect groups and individuals.103 Adults 
and teenagers who visited historic properties or cited to a local building 
                                                     
 98. See DONOVAN D. RYPKEMA & CAROLINE CHEONG, PLACEECONOMICS, GOOD 
NEWS IN TOUGH TIMES:  HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND THE GEORGIA ECONOMY 2 (2010), 
available at http://georgiashpo.org/sites/uploads/hpd/pdf/Economic_impact_study.pdf. 
 99. Id. at 4. 
100. See DONOVAN D. RYPKEMA ET AL., PLACEECONOMICS, PROFITS THROUGH 
PRESERVATION:  THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN UTAH (2013), availa-
ble at http://www.placeeconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/profits-through-
preservation_utah-shortreport.pdf; DONOVAN D. RYPKEMA & CAROLINE CHEONG, 
PLACEECONOMICS, INVESTMENT IN CONNECTICUT:  THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION (2011), available at 
http://www.cultureandtourism.org/cct/lib/cct/Economic_Impact_Study_(Final_6-2011).pdf; 
DONOVAN D. RYPKEMA & CAROLINE CHEONG, PLACEECONOMICS, THE DELAWARE HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION TAX CREDIT PROGRAM:  GOOD FOR THE ECONOMY, GOOD FOR THE 
ENVIRONMENT, GOOD FOR DELAWARE’S FUTURE (2010), available at  
http://history.delaware.gov/pdfs/rypkemaReport.pdf; TIMOTHY MCLENDON ET AL., Ctr. for 
Governmental Responsibility, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN FLORIDA:  
UPDATE, 2010 (2010), available at http://www.law.ufl.edu/_pdf/academics/centers-
clinics/centers/executive_summary_2010.pdf. 
101. DAVID BRADLEY ET AL., 5395 ASSESSING THE IMPORTANCE AND VALUE OF 
HISTORIC BUILDINGS TO YOUNG PEOPLE:  FINAL REPORT TO ENGLISH HERITAGE 5 (2011), 
available at http://www.english-heritage.org.uk/publications/historic-buildings-young-
people/importance-value-historic-buildings-young-people.pdf; David Bradley et al., Sense of 
Place and Social Capital and the Historic Built Environment:  Report of Research for English 
Heritage 2 (2009), available at http://hc.english-
heritage.org.uk/content/pub/sense_of_place_web.pdf.    
102. See BRADLEY ET AL, SENSE OF PLACE, supra note 101, at 8. 
103. Id.  
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or monument as being unique or special are likely to have a higher level 
of social capital, an important element in individual health as well as 
strong, resilient communities.104 These findings about the importance of 
historic resource preservation to the mental health and resiliency of in-
dividuals and communities echo the results of research in other fields 
that display the positive power of connecting present generations with 
the past: psychologists are discovering that children who know about 
their family’s history (good and bad) are more resilient because they can 
better moderate the effects of stress;105 and military academies have 
learned that “teaching recruits about the history of their service in-
creases their camaraderie and ability to bond more closely with their 
unit.”106 
ii. Resilience Index Indicators 
On economic, social, and psychological levels, historic preservation 
is a key component of city and citizen resilience. But what indicators can 
be used to show how well a city is supporting such resilience? In this 
part we discuss three City Resilience Index indicators for the preserva-
tion of historic and cultural resources. There are undoubtedly many 
more. The first two indicators are based around technology that assists 
governments in fulfilling their legal obligations to catalogue and make 
accessible detailed information about historic and cultural resources. 
The third indicator is a regulatory tool that can ensure swift, accurate 
assessment of historic resources following a disaster event. 
a. Online Historic Resources Database 
A fundamental principle for any effective and resilient historic re-
sources management framework is simple in theory, yet bedeviling in 
practice: know what you have.107 It is particularly difficult to know all of 
the historic resources located in a city because there are so many forms 
they can take—commercial buildings, archaeological sites, residential 
homes, public buildings, parks, monuments, battlefields, museums—and 
                                                     
104. Id. at 3, 8. 
105. See, e.g., Tage Rai, Mental Resilience and Narratives: Physiological Stress Re-
sponses to Media Coverage of 9/11 2 (Alfred P. Sloan Ctr. for Myth and Ritual in Am. Life 
Emory Univ., Working Paper No. 51, 2006), available at 
http://www.marial.emory.edu/research/index.html; Amber Lazarus, Relationships Among 
Indicators of Child and Family Resilience and Adjustment Following the September 11, 2001 
Tragedy 12 (The Emory Ctr. for Myth and Ritual in Am. Life, Working Paper No. 36, 2004), 
available at http://www.marial.emory.edu/research/index.html.   
106. Bruce Feiler, The Stories That Bind Us, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/fashion/the-family-stories-that-bind-us-this-
life.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
107. See generally Domesday: Britain’s Finest Treasure, THE NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/domesday/ (last visited April 24, 2014) (showing that the 
Domesday Book, the oldest surviving public document in England and perhaps England’s 
best known survey, was designed around this principle). 
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each year more and more resources may be classified under law as his-
toric.108 Nevertheless, most states, and some local governments, have 
historic resources statutes that require them to catalogue historic and 
cultural resources and offer them protections.109 To fulfill this obliga-
tion, many governments around the world utilize an online, publically 
accessible, searchable inventory using geographic information systems 
(GIS), which visualizes, analyzes, maps, and interprets data related to 
physical geography, including historic resources in urban areas.110 
The historic resources category of a City Resilience Index should 
include at least one indicator for assessing whether a state and/or local 
government uses an online, searchable historic resources inventory uti-
lizing GIS. This index indicator would give no credit for using an online 
historic resources database without GIS. Instead, the index would give a 
minimum score to cities and/or states that use a publically accessible 
GIS-based historic resources database with the possibility of enhanced 
scores for using databases that allow for the inclusion of detailed infor-
mation about each historic resource—building type, building name, the 
architectural style, the identity and age of the structure, boundaries of 
an archaeological site, and physical properties of the monument (e.g., 
support system, interior features, technical fittings)—and for having 
input 80% or more of a city’s known historic resources into the data-
base.111 
There are several reasons why the historic resources category of a 
City Resilience Index should include an indicator focused on an online 
inventory utilizing GIS. Here, we mention only two. First, GIS data-
bases are already a widely used planning tool, and they can be relatively 
inexpensive to establish and maintain.112 In fact, the Getty Conservation 
Institute and the World Monuments Fund have just rolled out an open-
source geospatial software system—ARCHES—that is purposefully built 
to help inventory and manage all kinds of immovable heritage to inter-
                                                     
108. A resource must typically be fifty years old and meet requirements for signifi-
cance and integrity before it may be designated as historic.  See Bronin & Rowberry, supra 
note 94, at ch. 2.   
109. See id.   
110. For a domestic example of a state historic resources inventory using GIS, see 
Georgia’s Natural, Archaeological, and Historic Resources GIS, GNAHRGIS, 
https://www.gnahrgis.org/gnahrgis/index.do (last visited April 24, 2014) [hereinafter 
GNAHRGIS]; For a description of the online Istanbul Cultural Inventory, see Ryan Rowber-
ry, Anchoring Memory in the Face of Disaster:  Istanbul’s Cultural Heritage Preservation 
Regime, BAHÇEŞEHIR U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript on file with the author). 
111. Most historic resources databases are far from complete.  For example, despite 
Georgia’s valiant efforts to transfer hand-written field survey notes for historic resources into 
its online database (GNAHRGIS), numerous older field survey reports and pictures have yet 
to be included.  See GNAHRGIS, supra note 110 (follow “here” hyperlink under “Disclaim-
er”).  
112. See What is Arches, ARCHES: HERITAGE INVENTORY & MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, 
http://archesproject.org/what-is-arches/ (last visited April 24, 2014). 
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nationally adopted standards.113 The ARCHES system is free and any 
organization can download, install, and customize it.114 Second, GIS da-
tabases have the capability of layering information spatially on a digital 
map.115 This allows governments to perform a range of activities that are 
important to a city’s long-term resilience during normal life and that are 
even more critical following a disaster.116 Some of these activities in-
clude pinpointing individual resources or grouping historic resources by 
zip code, county, or neighborhood; determining the needs and priorities 
for investigation, research, conservation, and management of historic 
sites in targeted areas or by type of resource; formulating management 
plans for investigating and/or conserving and leveraging historic re-
sources; creating risk maps for particularly vulnerable historic re-
sources; and raising awareness among the public and other authorities 
about the types and condition of historic resources in their areas.117 
b. Crowdsourcing Interface 
A powerful technological tool state and local governments can wield 
to foster city resilience through preserving historic resources is online 
crowdsourcing. Simply put, online crowdsourcing allows someone to ob-
tain needed services and/or content by soliciting voluntary contributions 
from the online public community rather than hiring employees or pay-
ing contractors.118 It has been an extremely effective, low-cost tool for 
preserving historic resources in many countries.119 The National Library 
of Finland, for instance, is using online crowdsourcing to index its 
scanned archives.120 Similarly, the University of Cape Town in South 
Africa is using online crowdsourcing to transcribe collections containing 
the Bushman’s language, stories, and way of life.121 The National Geo-
graphic Society is using online crowdsourcing to analyze millions of sat-
ellite images of Mongolia showing potential archaeological sites in the 
hopes of discovering the tombs of Genghis Khan and his descendants.122 
And an English non-profit organization has utilized online crowdsourc-
                                                     
113. Id.  
114. Id.  
115. See id. 
116. See id. 
117. Id. 
118. See, e.g., CROWDSOURSING.ORG, http://www.crowdsourcing.org/ (last visited 
April 24, 2014). 
119. See Tommaso De Benetti, Digitalkoot:  Crowdsourcing Finnish Cultural Herit-
age, CROWDSOURCING.ORG (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.crowdsourcing.org/document/digitalkoot-crowdsourcing-finnish-cultural-
heritage/9397. 
120. Id.  
121. Ngoni Munyaradzi, Crowdsourcing to Preserve Bushman Heritage, 
CROWDSOURCING.ORG (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.crowdsourcing.org/article/-crowdsourcing-
to-preserve-bushman-heritage/21527.  
122. See Field Expedition:  Mongolia, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, 
http://exploration.nationalgeographic.com/ (last visited April 24, 2014).   
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ing and online crowdfunding—funds donated by the interested public 
online—to provide both finances and labor for an expert-led excavation 
of a Bronze Age causeway composed of millions of timbers in the Cam-
bridgeshire fens.123 
The historic resources category of a City Resilience Index should 
include at least one indicator for assessing whether a state and/or local 
government uses a crowdsourcing interface on its inventory website. 
This index indicator will only give credit to local and/or state govern-
ments if they utilize an online crowdsourcing portal in conjunction with 
its historic resources inventory website. Enhanced index scores will be 
possible for jurisdictions that have organized five or more historic re-
sources crowdsourcing events in a single, calendar year. 
There are two reasons why the historic resources category of a City 
Resilience Index should include a crowdsourcing interface indicator. The 
first is scarce government resources.124 City and/or state authorities re-
sponsible for historic resources never have enough time, money, and 
staff to document and catalogue all known historic resources.125 It would 
be relatively easy to create an online portal attached to a state or local 
historic resources inventory website. This portal could offer training 
modules to citizens on historic resources recording practices and stand-
ards and afterwards ask them to collect and upload descriptive infor-
mation, statistics, pictures, videos, and maps on historic resources in 
their neighborhoods. While prominent historic resources are likely to 
have been catalogued, online crowdsourcing can be extremely useful for 
recording smaller-scale historic resources (e.g., façades) that deserve 
cataloguing and protection but are low priority. To ensure quality con-
trol, any information uploaded to this portal could be screened and vet-
ted by the appropriate authorities before adding it to the inventory. In 
this way, cities and/or states could gather and preserve vast amounts of 
data related to their historic resources in a short period of time and at 
minimal cost. 
Second, online crowdsourcing fosters civic pride, a sense of commu-
nity, and a deeper, more tangible connection to the city’s past, particu-
larly for those of younger generations who are adept at using technolo-
gy.126 The social effect of such participation is an increased resilience to 
                                                     
123. Jason Palmer, Flag Fen Hosts ‘Crowdsourced’ Bronze Age Archaeology Dig, 
BBC NEWS: SCI. & ENV’T (Aug. 13, 2012), www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-
19192220. 
124. See e.g., The Economic Problem, available at 
http://www.ssag.sk/SSAG%20study/EKO/scarce%20resources.pdf (discussing the govern-
ments limited amount of resources).  
125. See Issues for Historic Resources, LANDSCAPES2.ORG, 
http://www.landscapes2.org/issues/HistoricRes.cfm (last visited April 24, 2014) (discussing 
the “limited funding for historic preservation projects”).  
126. See e.g., Mark Newman et. al., Understanding the drivers, impact and value of 
engagement in culture and sport: An overarching summary of the research 28 (July 2010), 
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economic shocks or natural disasters because community participants in 
historic preservation crowdsourcing become intimately invested in the 
future of the city.127 Additionally, this strategy offers governments and 
communities peace of mind knowing that, should a disaster occur, as 
many historic resources as possible have been preserved for future gen-
erations.128 
c. Streamlined Environmental/Historic Review Process 
During times of disaster, lengthy environmental and historic re-
sources review processes can jeopardize the integrity of historic re-
sources, keep residents in historic structures from rehabilitating their 
homes, and stop local governments from restoring critical historic areas. 
State and local environmental and historic resources review processes 
are usually modeled on two federal statutes: the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA);129 and Section 106 of the National Historic Act 
(NHPA).130 Most state environmental protection statutes closely track 
NEPA by requiring an environmental review when a proposed agency 
action significantly impacts, or is likely to significantly impact, the envi-
ronment.131 Similarly, the NHPA requires the governor of every state to 
appoint a State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) to administer a 
preservation program in the state.132 The SHPO consults with federal 
agencies when a federal undertaking has an effect on the state’s cultural 
heritage that is listed on or eligible for listing on the National Register 
                                                                                                                           
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/71231/CASE-
supersummaryFINAL-19-July2010.pdf (elaborating on English research that has begun 
measuring the positive impact that participation in cultural endeavors has on people); see 
also, e.g., BRADLEY ET AL, SENSE OF PLACE, supra note 101, at 3, 8 (discussing the positive 
effects of a historic environment).   
127. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 105, at 2 (discussing how individuals with more histor-
ical knowledge had great mental resilience following 9/11).  
128. See, e.g., Crowd Sourcing Used to Gather Property Information, 
GEOENGINEERS.COM, http://www.geoengineers.com/news/crowd-sourcing-used-gather-
property-information (last visited April 24, 2014) (discussing how “Crowd sourcing leverages 
technology to enable communities, agencies, and even privately held businesses contribute 
information and data to help fill a public need.”).  
129. NEPA requires that federal agencies prepare a “detailed statement” for “major 
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” prior to initiat-
ing any such action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)–(D) (2012). 
130. NHPA Section 106 requires federal agencies to  “take into account the effect of 
the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligi-
ble for inclusion in the National Register” prior to initiating action.  16 U.S.C. § 470f (2012). 
131. For example, the State Environmental Protection Acts of California, Connecti-
cut, and Georgia require an environmental impact statement whenever a state project “may” 
significantly affect the environment.  See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100(a) (West, Westlaw 
through urgency legislation through Ch. 1 of 2014 Reg. Sess. and all propositions on the 
6/3/2014 ballot); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-1b(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Supple-
ment to the General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-16-4(a) 
(West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Regular Session). 
132. 16 U.S.C.A. § 470a(6) (2000).  
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of Historic Places as well as the State Register.133 Such federal under-
takings include federal permits, licenses, or funding that state or local 
governments need to begin rehabilitating or protecting historic re-
sources.134  Thus, prior to the granting of federal, state, or local permits 
and funds for the rehabilitation of historic resources, both an environ-
mental and historic resources review must be completed for each indi-
vidual historic resource.135  
As implementation of the environmental and historic review pro-
cesses taught post Katrina, inartful implementation of these processes 
can impede important long-term recovery efforts.136 Federal long-term 
recovery monies cannot be dispensed to reimburse state and local gov-
ernments for recovery work until the environmental and historic re-
views are completed.137 That means homeowners repairing their resi-
dences following a disaster event—whether historic or not—and seeking 
reimbursement through a state or local government’s federally-funded 
home rehabilitation project, cannot receive reimbursement for repair 
costs until an environmental review has been performed on the home.138 
Ironically, this could potentially delay repairs to historic properties. 
Unnecessary delay in protecting and rehabilitating historic resources 
after a disaster may be avoided by creating a regulation, streamlining 
                                                     
133. Importantly, the SHPO is required to cooperate with federal agencies, state 
agencies, local governments, organizations, and individuals to “ensure that historic proper-
ties are taken into consideration at all levels of planning and development.” 16 U.S.C.A. § 
470a(b)(3)(F) (2000) (emphasis added).  
134. The NHPA regulations define an undertaking as: 
a project, activity, or program funded in whole or in part under the direct or in-
direct jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including [a] those carried out by or on 
behalf of a Federal agency; [b] those carried out with Federal financial assis-
tance; and [c] those requiring a Federal permit, license or approval. 
36 C.F.R. § 800.16(y) 
135. For instance the distribution of Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Community Development Block Grants to state and local governments qualify as a 
major federal action under NEPA (requiring an environmental review) as well as federal 
undertaking under NHPA (requiring a Section 106 historic resources review).   
136. See Eric Holdeman, Hurricane Katrina and the Lessons Learned from Missis-
sippi’s Recovery, EMERGENCY MGMT. (Aug. 29, 2012), 
http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/Hurricane-Katrina-Lessons-Learned-Mississippis-
Recovery.html; see also Hurricane Katrina Critical Challenges, WHITE HOUSE, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/chapter5.html 
(last visited April 24, 2014). 
137. See 24 C.F.R. § 58.22(a) (2013); see also DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW 
AND LITIGATION 7:10 (2d ed. 2013). 
138. See, e.g., Rep. Clarke Urges Fewer Restrictions on Sandy Relief, U.S. 
CONGRESSWOMAN YVETTE D. CLARKE (July 3, 2013), http://clarke.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/rep-clarke-urges-fewer-restrictions-on-sandy-relief (In a letter to HUD 
Secretary Shaun Donovan, a member of New York City’s congressional delegation asked that 
HUD “waive environmental reviews for homeowners to expedite repairs.”)(quote from press 
release summary not the letter itself). 
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the environmental and historic resources review processes during times 
of disaster. 
The regulation category of a City Resilience Index should include at 
least one indicator assessing whether state and/or local governments 
have a streamlined environmental and historic review process that will 
operate in times of disaster.139 The index indicator will give cities and/or 
states credit for having a streamlined regulation in place. Enhanced in-
dex scores will be possible if a jurisdiction has adopted some form of 
programmatic agreement with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) to coordinate and expedite the environmental and his-
toric resources review processes.140 
There are several reasons why the regulation category of a City Re-
silience Index for state and local governments should include a stream-
lined regulation for the environmental and historic review processes. 
The first is time. Following disaster, there is no time for legislators to 
devise a streamlined alternative to the normal review processes; they 
are busy tending their families, homes, and devastated communities. 
Such streamlined regulations may take many forms. One possibility is 
for state and local governments to integrate their environmental and 
historic resources review processes, much like the federal government 
has recently done.141 This helps to avoid duplicative review efforts, sav-
ing time and resources. Another possibility is for states and/or localities 
to sign a programmatic agreement with FEMA “to exclude specific rou-
tine activities from Section 106 review and streamline project evaluation 
during all phases of emergency response.”142 Prototype programmatic 
agreements are available online.143 
The second reason is money. As noted above, environmental and 
historic resources review processes must be completed before the dis-
                                                     
139. See Essential Eight: Environmental Protection and Strengthening of Ecosys-
tems, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, 
http://www.unisdr.org/campaign/resilientcities/toolkit/essentials/view/8 (last visited April 24, 
2014); see also NATURAL HAZARDS CTR., HOLISITIC DISASTER RECOVERY: IDEAS FOR BUILDING 
LOCAL SUSTAINABILITY AFTER A NATURAL DISASTER ii (rev. 2005), available at 
www.riskinstitute.org/peri/images/file/HDR.pdf . 
140. A Model Statewide Programmatic Agreement has been created by the Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. This 
Model Statewide Programmatic Agreement is designed to be customized by individual states 
and localities.  See Federal Emergency Management Agency Model Statewide Programmatic 
Agreement, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., http://www.achp.gov/fema-pa.html (last 
updated Sep. 21, 2010) [hereinafter FEMA Model Statewide Programmatic Agreement]. 
141. See COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & ADVISORY 
COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., NEPA AND NHPA:  A HANDBOOK FOR INTEGRATING NEPA AND 
SECTION 106 (March 2013), available at 
www.achp.gov/docs/NEPA_NHPA_Section_106_Handbook_Mar2013.pdf. 
142. FEMA Model Statewide Programmatic Agreement, supra note 138.  
143. See FEMA Prototype Programmatic Agreement, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON 
HISTORIC PRES., http://www.achp.gov/fema_prototype_pa.html (last updated Dec. 18, 2013); 
see also Programmatic Agreements, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
http://www.fema.gov/environmental-planning-and-historic-preservation-
program/programmatic-agreements (last updated June 15, 2012).  
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bursement of moneys to facilitate the protection or rehabilitation of his-
toric resources. Put simply, not a dime of federal, state, or local moneys 
can flow to restore or repair historic resources until these reviews are 
completed.144 But, if states and/or cities have streamlined regulations 
and a programmatic agreement in place before disaster strikes, these 
reviews can be finished efficiently so that money can be released to help 
rehabilitate historic buildings and homes. Otherwise, many historic re-
sources may be in danger of festering in mold or mildew, or falling due 
to prolonged structural instabilities.145 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article contributes to an ongoing and longer-term exploration 
of how an index can be used as a tool to build better cities and to pre-
pare them to weather adversity. As a growing body of scholarly work 
examining urban resilience signals, it is more essential than ever that 
cities learn from disaster experiences to both nurture thriving cities and 
bolster their defenses to all manner of adversity. An index promises to 
serve as a transparent, data driven tool to assist in this effort. 
Legal scholars and experienced legal practitioners can make par-
ticularly valuable contributions to the establishment of an index as a 
policy tool. As most of the Index indicators discussed in this article 
show, proficiency at using legal tools and knowing how to navigate legal 
requirements are core competencies for city building and long-term dis-
aster recovery.146 The City Resilience Index promises to support and fo-
cus the day-to-day work of federal and state lawmakers and policy ad-
ministrators. The City Resilience Index also offers agencies at all levels 
of government the opportunity to advance significantly the way they 
think about crafting disaster response laws. 
The federal legislative response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
displayed a restrained and largely reactive view of the federal – state – 
local community development partnership. Under that view, the federal 
                                                     
144. See Louisiana Land Trust, Disclosure of Environmental Factors (copy on file 
with the authors). If a person purchased a so-called Road Home buyout property—a property 
acquired from a Louisiana homeowner who wished to sell her home instead of rebuilding—
from the State of Louisiana’s Louisiana Land Trust (LLT), the prospective purchaser was 
furnished with a disclosure form. The disclosure informed the purchaser that “[b]ased on the 
State of Louisiana’s Office of Community Development’s review of all residential properties 
sold to the State of Louisiana under Option 2 and 3 of the Road Home Program [e.g., the 
buyout program], a review of environmental data bases, site reconnaissance, and comments 
received from various federal, state and local agencies, a number of environmental factors 
and conditions were identified for certain properties that may warrant disclosure.” See id. 
The form also provided several lines for the LLT to check if the property raised any of the 
enumerated environmental or historic review concerns. See id. 
145. See, e.g., Mold & Mildew Preventative Treatment Following Natural Disasters, 
MOLD INSTITUTE USA, http://www.moldinstituteusa.com/Resources/naturaldisaster.php. 
146. See supra Part III.B. 
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government’s principal recovery role was to furnish money to the states, 
provide limited technical assistance to disaster stricken communities, 
and unleash programmatic audits to chase down expected non-
compliance on the back end of disaster recovery projects.147 The City 
Resilience Index reinforces recent federal efforts to calibrate urban revi-
talization policy more effectively than was done for New Orleans and 
the Gulf Coast.148 This new federal approach emphasizes and demands 
coordination, cooperation, and communication between and among fed-
eral, state, and local governments.149 The federal approach to deploying 
                                                     
147. Initial federal recovery legislation from 2005 and 2006 put special emphasis on 
funding HUD Inspector General review and monitoring of local government agencies by 
threatening back-end audits.  HUD official Fred Tombar, III, reported that the State Road 
Home Program was audited over 52 times between June 2006 and August 2009. See Imple-
mentation of the Road Home Program Four Years After Hurricane Katrina: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the Comm. on Fin. Servs, 111th Cong. 8 
(2009) (statement of Frederick Tombar, Sr. Advisor for Disaster Recovery, U.S. Dep’t of 
Hous. and Urban Dev.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111hhrg53250/html/CHRG-111hhrg53250.htm.  Congress’ supplemental Hurricane Katrina 
recovery legislation earmarked $9,000,000 for the HUD Inspector General oversight. Mean-
while, the same federal recovery legislation provided only modest funding for technical assis-
tance — $400,000. See H.R. 4939, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted). 
148. The federal government’s response to the devastating neighborhood impact of 
the mortgage foreclosure crisis represents an example of pairing grant funds with proactive 
technical assistance.  See Notice of Availability: Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) for 
the Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2 Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act, 2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 21377 (May 7, 2009). The Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2 
(NSP-2) promoted acquisition and redevelopment of vacant and abandoned properties and 
was designed to help local governments overcome local limitations that may have been ob-
stacles to getting crisis response dollars into a city’s neighborhoods.  See MALLACH, supra 
note 59.  Further, NSP-2 was explicitly data driven to give government grant funds the 
greatest chance of reaching communities in need. See IRA GOLDSTEIN, MAXIMIZING THE 
IMPACT OF FEDERAL NSP INVESTMENTS THROUGH THE STRATEGIC USE OF LOCAL MARKET 
DATA, in REO & VACANT PROPERTIES:  STRATEGIES FOR NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZATION 65 
(2010), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/REO-and-vacant-properties/index.htm. 
149. The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act represents one of the chief examples of 
Congress’ efforts to rethink how the federal government can most effectively deliver help to 
state and local governments following catastrophes.  See Disaster Relief Appropriations Act 
and Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4. For instance, 
the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, directs that federal agencies implementing disaster 
recovery projects need not complete separate environmental reviews to satisfy regulatory 
requirements imposed by different regulatory regimes, such as FEMA and HUD administra-
tive rules for environmental review. See Landrieu Praises Passage of Disaster Relief Fund-
ing, Critical Reforms, MARY LANDRIEU: U.S. SENATOR FOR LOUISIANA (Jan. 28, 2013), http:// 
www.landrieu.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=3580.  Post-Katrina long-term recovery ef-
forts were delayed by such redundant and duplicative requirements.  See id; see also U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, HURRICANE 
SANDY REBUILDING STRATEGY: STRONGER COMMUNITIES, A RESILIENT REGION 13 (Aug. 
2013), available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2013/HUD
No.13-125 (President Obama created the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force by Execu-
tive Order, signed December 7, 2012, “to ensure the [Sandy] recovery benefitted from cabi-
net-level focus and coordination” and to “identify[ ] and work[ ] to remove obstacles to resili-
ent rebuilding while taking into account existing and future risks and promoting the long-
term sustainability of communities and ecosystems in the Sandy-affected region”). 
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disaster relief thus eschews the conception of the federal role in disaster 
recovery as one that delivers money to the states, allows local govern-
ments to founder as they implement recovery plans, and then ‘catches’ 
those local governments in frustration or failure through post-hoc au-
dits. A City Resilience Index can be an integral part of a more collabora-
tive way of implementing long-term disaster and urban revitalization 
policy. It can identify the coordinated, concrete and, thus, most cost-
effective steps that cities can take—long before disasters strike or even 
if disaster or crisis never strikes—to neutralize critical community vul-
nerabilities and create more resilient cities. 
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